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Abstract: After the Arab spring, direct linkage between growth of technological hybridization of 
media systems and political online-to-offline protest spill-overs seemed evident, at least in several 
aspects, as ‘twitter revolutions’ showed organizational potential of the mediated communication of 
today. But in de-facto politically transitional countries hybridization of media systems is capable of 
performing not just organizational but also ‘cultivational’ roles in terms of creating communicative 
milieus where protest consensus is formed, provoking spill-overs from expressing political opinions 
online to street protest.The two cases of Italy and Russia are discussed in terms of  their non-
finished process of transition to democracy and the media’s role within the recent political process. 
In the two cases, media-political conditions have called into being major cleavages in national 
deliberative space that may be conceptualized like formation of nation-wide public counter-spheres 
based upon alternative agenda and new means of communication. The structure and features of 
these counter-spheres are reconstructed; to check whether regional specifics are involved into the 
formation of this growing social gap, quantitative analysis of regional online news media (website 
menus) is conducted. Several indicators for spotting the formation of counter-spheres and criteria 
for further estimation of democratic quality of such counter-spheres are suggested. 
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The context of the world economic recession of the second half of the 2000s has 
brought to light deepening socio-political cleavages previously less evident; 
political discontent of the less wealthy social strata with mainstream decision-
making grew to the extent that it filled city streets with multi-thousand protest 
rallies across Europe and Americas. These ranged from the Occupy and 
DemocracyNow nearly-global movements to national and local street protest, both 
peaceful and violent, in the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Greece, Hungary, 
Russia and many other very different countries.  




After the Arab spring, direct linkage between the growth of Internet usage and the 
hybridization of media systems and political online-to-offline protest spill-overs  
seemed quite evident to many commentators upon ‘tweeted revolutions’. Indeed, 
similarities in the process of offline network-building and communication inside 
the protest groups in the respective protesting communities were spotted (Castells 
2012; Dang-Anh, Einspaenner, Thimm 2012). Other authors, though, reasonably 
warned of too simplistic approaches to causality in these cases. 
 
Earlier, we have hypothesized (and at least partly proved) another view on the role 
of new politically and technically ‘hybrid’ media systems (Chadwick 2011) in 
triggering political protest (Bodrunova & Litvinenko 2013).Our empirical research 
on participants of the 2011-2012 ‘For fair elections’ Russian protest movement was 
carried out in summer 2012. The online survey based on 29-question 
questionnaire covered 652 protest rally participants (mostly from Moscow), with 
full response rate circa 2/3. To further check and interpret the results, 11 in-depth 
interviews were also conducted (4 expert ones and 7 ‘Internet users vs. non-users’ 
ones). The results showed that the role of media was not just organizational but 
also ‘cultivational’, as it helped prepare common ground for political protest via 
creating shared agenda, understanding of events, orientations, ethos and practices. 
We proved temporal correlations between changes in media diets of protesters and 
the growth of freedom in online behavior, as well as between dynamics of protest 
and consumption of special sorts of media and ‘junction’ persons. But we also 
found that there was no direct online/offline media opposition in media diets of 
the protesters and non-protesters, as the protest media diet was not fully 
dominated by online text media (portals, blogs, microblogs) or social networks; 
this contradicts some previous findings on digital divide or press divide in Europe 
and Russia (Castells 2007; Censis 2011; Chistov & Kazarjan 2011). Rather, the 
cleavage between media used mostly by the protest community and other media 
lay in the area of agendas and interpretations, not platforms. This is also supported 
by the spotted divergence trends in media consumption, like decline in use of 
mainstream TV channels parallel to growing consumption of radio and several 
online outlets. Thus, what we found for Russia can be described as the following: 
fragmentation of the nation-scale media use and agenda flows, with cleavages 
cutting across online/offline division and several new technologically ‘hybrid’ 
(online+offline) media clusters appearing, with the result of destruction of both 
agenda and discussion bridges between fragments of media-based public sphere. 
This encapsulation of several (in most cases, two) main audience groups within 
their agendas and deliberation milieus with almost no bridges between those two 
have lead us to the idea of formation of a nation-scale public counter-sphere – that 
is, of a major split between the dominant national deliberative space based on 
consumption of national media (federal TV channels and mid-market and tabloid 
newspapers) and a new, perhaps still vague and relatively small but politically 
active social milieu cutting across traditional demographic stratification. 
 
 




The situation is strikingly reminiscent of the late Soviet times when the so-called 
‘first culture’ and ‘second culture’ formed in big cities. Our results do not allow us 
to go deep inside the inner structure of the counter-sphere in terms of 
reconstructing interconnections of its bearers or assessing deliberative qualities of 
the new communicative milieu, but the mental construct of the counter-sphere 
provides us with a useful framework for describing the deliberative split. 
 
At the same time, formation of new segments of media systems beyond traditional 
right-left or mainstream/opposition cleavage can be traced in other countries, of 
which we habitually think of as (at least more) democratic than of those of the 
Central & Eastern European (CEE) region. One of these countries is, to our 
viewpoint, Italy, where we have traced a similar rise of a ‘new wave’ of liberal-
oriented information sources in 2009-2010 (Bodrunova 2011a), practically the 
same time such media appeared in notable numbers in Russia.  
 
As objects for analysis, countries as different as Russia and Italy still have several 
features in common that allow speculations upon common trends. In at least 
several respects, for post-Soviet Russia as well as for the Second Italian Republic, 
the last 20 years were to be the time of transition to stable democracy or at least 
stable democratization. Italy has passed through a major ‘denouement of the 
[political] system’ in 1992-1994 (Bull & Newell 2005: 12), and the transition to the 
Second republic meant re-establishment of the system’s democratic grounds, 
including the party, voting, and local administration systems in order to escape 
from partocracy, stabilize the political routines, and regain popular trust. Russia, 
after 1991, had to establish the democratic institutional framework practically for 
the first time ever, as pre-revolutionary experience of the early 20th century was 
too fragile and immature in terms of democratic quality and stability of the 
political system. The establishment of the new system had purposes very similar to 
those in Italy, as regaining trust, stabilizing the major political process and 
escaping from partocracy were among the major goals of the reform settlers. 
 
The modernization of the respective political systems produced, seemingly, very 
different results. In terms of general democratic development, indices of 
democratization, proportion of material/postmaterial values as the basis for social 
consensus etc., Italy went well ahead of Russia; in terms of economic vulnerability, 
it proved to be weaker in opposing the pressures of the world recession. But, as 
theorists note, both countries are known for its antidemocratic drawbacks in many 
respects including failed prospects for formation of a healthy public sphere based 
on independence and democratic diversity of media, as well as upon equal access 
of citizens to political and deliberative involvement. If the formation of some new 
media clusters driven, at least partly, by extra-commercial reasons is a common 
trend for the two countries (and later on becomes one of protest triggers), one 
needs to look closer into how and why these cluster form and whether they really 
lead to formation of nation-wide splits in the national public spheres. 
 




Research theory and methodology 
 
For today, in both Italy and Russia, we hypothesize the formation of nation-scale 
public counter-spheres across the hybrid media systems under pressure of a 
dominant political & communicative climate. Their formation, functioning and 
societal reaction to them, as reflected by the media sphere, may be assessed using 
theory on democratic quality of national public spheres, especially in terms of 
political diversity of media and alternation of information sources (Dahl 1979; 
Voltmer 2000).  
 
Put simplistically, Habermasian theory of public deliberation as a way of 
democratic political participation describes the public sphere normatively, as an 
inclusive space of equal chances for political communicative action. But two 
objections relevant to our case have risen almost straight away.  
 
First, with the mediatization of society (Mazzoleni 2008), the ideal information 
society, in political terms, has not formed: due to economic and organizational 
advantages available to formally licensed media no one can speak of equal 
deliberative potential for communicating actors; media are more and more 
perceived as the ‘junctions’ of main communication flows, and scholars talk of 
media-constructed public spheres (Calhoun 1992; Gerhards 1997; Schulz 1997: 
59). Spatial metaphors of lattice, information flows etc., are drawn in to describe 
the ‘junction’ nature of media in the public spheres. Thus, we should expect a 
public sphere to consist of ‘junctions’ and ‘environment’. This may raise an issue of 
communicative equality, as the ideal deliberative equality is distorted by social 
cleavages reflected in unequal access to expression of views and by varying social 
capital of the communicators, as well as by structural and political media biases 
(Voltmer 2000). This is why the democratization potential of Internet was, in first 
theoretical assessments, based on horizontalization of societal communication 
structures where media were to be put to the level of consumers.  
 
Second, many conservative, liberal and left critics have, with equal eagerness, 
pointed out to the oppressive and anti-pluralistic nature of normatively 
understood public spheres (Negt & Kluge (1972)1993; Luhmann 1990; Mouffe 
2000: 93, 2005: 3; Kleinsteuber 2001). Any stable situation in the public 
discursive space is perceived by them as ‘temporary hegemony or instant 
stabilization of power’ (Karppinen, Moe, Svensson 2008: 10). In such cases, public 
counter-spheres are said to be forming (Fraser 1990; Fenton & Downey 2003; 
Wimmer 2005).  
 
As our previous research shows, such ‘temporary hegemony / stabilization of 
power’ may be gained by political actors when they dominate the discourse via 
spinning or emasculating it of substance. Such type of dominance provides 
‘political honeymoons’ for relatively long periods (even years) but is destructive in 
the long-term perspective for the whole political system at the given level, 




including the national one (Bodrunova 2010a). To spot such stabilization of power, 
we used situational analysis. The result of such situations may vary in its intensity, 
but it inevitably lowers legitimacy of incumbent executives, further polarizes 
divergent social milieus, and raises protest activity. Moreover, emasculation of 
political discourse leads to searching for alternative discursive milieus within the 
existing social cleavages, thus further fostering the fragmentation of the 
mainstream public sphere. In Italy and Russia of 2011-2012, we argue, the 
situation went that far as to the appearance of alternative, anti-mainstream public 
spheres that would reshape the mainstream approach to the growing left/right, 
urban/rural, native/migrant and many other tensions on the national level. In 
order to understand the shape and structure of the respective public counter-
spheres, we need to reconstruct what they wanted to be delivered from. 
 
Counter-spheres are usually studied on the level of a community (like subcultures) 
or even one media outlet as the bearer of a counter-mainstream culture (Mitchell 
1998; O’Donnell 2001). They are perceived as phenomena local in terms of 
territorial reach and people involved. The notion of the counter-spheres near-to-
never provided chances to be studied on the level of a social stratum or a society on 
the whole, due to the nature of the concept which implies opposition to 
mainstream, that is, opposition of the smaller (phenomenal) to the general 
(contextual). Previously, Internet-based spaces were thought to become counter-
spheres, without specification on whether it could be Internet loci or the net on the 
whole as a sort of environment. But hybridization of media systems (Chadwick 
2011), growth of Internet use and massive penetration of social networks allows us 
to suggest that counter-spheres may stretch from one media to cross-platform, 
audience-oriented, nation-wide communicative milieus, and these phenomena 
need to be assessed in terms of rise/fall of democratic quality of the national public 
spheres.  
 
To prove our position, we will use situational analysis of the period of 2009–2012 
to reconstruct the context of media-political interaction and the formation of 
public spheres in the two countries. As recommended for policy research by the 
Oxford school (Buse & Young 2006), consistent situational analysis needs to have 
actors, process, context, content and results examined. Under ‘results’, we will 
understand the rise of the counter-spheres; since we are not interested in policy 
content but in the context of social response to them, we will focus on ‘context’ 
involving social, political, and communicative conditions and examine media-
political relations (‘actors’ and ‘process’) on the national level.  
 
Second, we will try to see via quantitative analysis of online news sources whether 
the formation of counter-spheres in metropolitan areas is supported on regional 
and/or local level. We will analyze menus of several clusters of local online media 
to show shifts in basic agenda from local newspapers to news portals that can be 
described as those with alternative agenda.  
 




In conclusion, several criteria for spotting the formation of public counter-spheres 
and judging their (anti-)democratic potential are suggested for further 
development. 
 
Reconstructing context: ‘Antipolitica’ vs. ‘Second Stagnation’ 
 
The socio-economic and political-process context of the development of Italy and 
Russia of the last 20 years is well described elsewhere (Bull & Newell 2005; Calise 
2006; Ledeneva 2006; Shin & Agnew 2008; Newell 2010; Remington 2011; White 
2011; Mendras 2012; Robinson 2012). Here, we will reconstruct only the trends 
that we consider: 1) common for both countries; 2) shaping the democratic quality 
of the respective national public spheres.  
 
In sociological terms, the biggest possible framework for the discussion of 
fragmentation of the public sphere is the idea of multi-speed development of a 
polity, as communication is expected to be much more intense within the social 
milieus formed via speed differentiation than between them. The biggest societal 
cleavage of this sort is described today as ‘three Italies’ (Bagnasco 1977; Bull & 
Newell 2005: 69) and ‘four Russias’ (Zubarevich 2011) with varying (sometimes 
contrasting) levels of income and savings, ethnic identity, education, extent of 
exposure to manual labor, urbanization trends etc. In the case of Italy, the well-
known division of the country into Northern, Mid and Southern Italy matters in 
terms of industry structure, labor-based stratification and voting preferences, 
separatist potential, cultural and ethnic origins, migration flows, language use etc. 
In Russia’s case, the division is more recent but also cuts across political, 
economic, and social parameters forming, in Natalia Zubarevich’s terms, four 
distinctive social milieus: that of post-industrial middle-class big cities (circa 21% 
of population in the 12 biggest cities only and over 36% if the cities of over 
300,000 inhabitants are considered); that of over 300 industrial cities ranging 
from 20,000 to sometimes even 700,000 inhabitants with mostly Soviet habitus 
(circa 25%); that of the ‘vast periphery’ inhabited by the dwellers of villages and 
small cities (circa 38%); and that of areas of North Caucasus and South Siberia 
lacking industrial development (circa 6%).  
 
To this list we will add general levels of media consumption, media diets of 
particular strata, levels of Internet penetration, and shape of digital divide. If in 
Italy the three zones have clear geographical tint, in Russia the description of basic 
milieus is more complicated; they cut across the country and are marked with, 
rather, urban/rural differences, like living in cities of a particular size population 
or having access to city attractions. These divisions are reflected in the respective 
divisions of the common communicative space, thus lowering its democratic 
potential by growth of exclusion practices and absence / low percentage of shared 
agenda between the milieus. 
 
 




As the protest rallies in both Italy and Russia of 2011-2012 showed, the level of 
legitimacy of the national leadership and executives was minimal in at least one 
social milieu – ‘creative class’ or ‘angry city dwellers’ as a part of the ‘first Russia’ 
(Vezhlyan 2011; Kachkaeva 2012) and studentship and their parents and teachers 
in Italy  – but in both cases the feeling was that ‘the society at large’ appeared on 
the streets (Della Porta, Mosca, Parks 2012). In Italy, ‘a considerable drop in trust’ 
to institutions was evident for commentators (Ibid.), but at the same time Edelman 
agency spotted a rise in trust to the same institutions for end-2010 (Seaman 2011). 
So, this suggests a growing split in public perception of the ruling elites, which 
inevitably fuelled the protest spill-over. And for us the crisis of legitimacy was 
connected to but not fully explained by the current political events in both 
countries (anti-austerity measures in Italy and parliamentary and presidential 
elections in Russia), and thus was deeper than annual fluctuations registered by 
polling agencies. We consider the current events to be just primary triggers of the 
spill-overs, but not their full explanatory causes. The crisis of legitimacy that could 
bring to the streets literally hundreds of thousands of city dwellers in Moscow and 
Rome of 2011 had to be prepared by more factors and in advance. 
 
Below, we reconstruct the context in three areas at the national level: democratic 
development, media-political relations, and the very recent media system 
development that provides the dynamics to the mediated political process. 
 
Transitional drawbacks in political development 
 
Italy and Russia, though very different in most results of democratic 
modernization, show significant similarities in the democratic quality of several 
major features of national political process - which is reflected in its public 
perception. Common trends in politics that potentially lower the democratic 
quality of the public discussion are more than one.  
 
First of all, many commentators have pointed to ‘transitional drawbacks’ in many 
terms (Bull & Newell 2005; Melville 2007; Hintba 2008), including electoral law 
(lowering proportional representation in Italy of 2006 and in Russia by several 
steps in 2000-2012). The signs of ‘comebacks’ to over-20-years-past were seen in 
several areas. First, it was lowering political rotation on the top level (personified 
by Silvio Berlusconi and Vladimir Putin) that lowered the belief in real change and 
importance of one’s own electoral voice. Second, there are evident signs of a 
comeback of habitual partocracy and failure of meaningful political competition. 
In Italy, after a short period of diversity of party positioning in the mid-1990s, the 
boiling grassroots and local political movements are, again, practically inevitably 
attracted to the left/right opposition on the top level (Bodrunova 2012). In Russia, 
the ‘United Russia’ party under Vladimir Putin’s (in)formal leadership has created 
major presence in regional and local elective and executive bodies, these activities 
mirrored, often farcically, by the four parties of the so-called ‘systemic’ opposition. 
Third, the very existence of systemic and non-systemic opposition, with high 




barriers of entering parliament (for Russia) and complicated ways to form an 
apriori coalition (for Italy), may be considered ‘prolongued drawbacks’, as it 
resembles the times when big parts of population did not have any voice in the 
public sphere. 
 
Another feature of similarity is the distinct clientelist nature of relations in political 
and civil service areas (Rimsky 2001; Hallin & Mancini 2004: 56-59; Briquet 
2009). Here, one may recall everyday social practices of nepotism and horizontal 
networking, high levels of corruption and economic crime, tight connections of 
national politics with big business (the political role of Confindustria and 
Berlusconi’s Mediolanum and Fininvest, among others, in Italy and industrial 
corporations with state stake-holding in Russia), non-overcome private interests 
and undercover lobbying in the absence of legal lobbyist mechanisms. Taken 
together, these features lead to re-feudalization of decision-making and policing 
(Habermas 1962). One more feature shared by the two countries is short-termism 
in policing (Neklessa 2006; Monti 2013) crucial for the basic configuration of 
political process (Pugachev & Soloviev 2000), which may be explained by relatively 
frequent and radical regime changes within the last 150 years in both countries. 
Another feature is all-catchism (Forestiere 2009; Wilson 2011) and populism in 
mainstream party politics. To support Berlusconi and Putin at the elections of 
2008, ideologically and organizationally vague, catch-all, patriotism-based support 
movements were created, namely the All-Russian People’s Front (ONF) for Russia 
and the transformed ‘Popolo della Libertà’ for Italy. In both countries, the 
vagueness of political positioning in moderate parts of political spectrum has 
pushed some substantial political initiatives out to end-of-spectrum and grassroots 
politics, among those – radical right and left, autonomist/separatist, and anti-
political ones.  
 
Maybe due to the population being tired of the malfunctioning politics, in 2008-
2012, the last full electoral cycle in both Russia and Italy, the phenomenon of 
grassroots social and political movements became especially evident, though in a 
bit different ways. In Italy, further radicalization of youth movements could be 
spotted, the biggest initiatives (UltraS, Casa Pound and others) belonging to the far 
right part of political spectrum. Another sign of the ‘social rise’ was the appearance 
of non-economic-based strikes and manifestations of major scale, including the 
one in 2010 on the rights of free access to information, the action supported in 
many capitals of the world.  
 
In Italy where work protest activity, including general strikes, is well-organized, 
regular and channeled by CGIL, FIOM and other trade unions: in 2011, of 172 
strikes, ‘2 out of 5 were organized by informal groups, more than one third by 
trade unions, and one third by other formal associations <…>’ making unions ‘the 
single most active civil society actor organizing protest in the country’ (Della Porta, 
Mosca, Parks 2012). But in Russia, which had not been used to organized 
corporate or social action, the ‘social rise’ became an almost equally wide 




phenomenon, being the first manifestation of the latently existing public sphere 
beyond political and media discussion milieus. Its outbursts that received nation-
wide attention were local protests throughout the country against ‘monetization of 
social benefits’, protection of Khimki forest close to Moscow from state plans for 
highway construction, help to homeless people by MD Elizaveta Glinka (‘Doctor 
Liza’) and her allies, all-Russian and local networking in search for people lost in 
forests, or a struggle against Gazprom’s project of a ‘business tower’ in the city 
centre of St. Petersburg (the Okhta Centre case). This activism had two features: it 
did not interact substantially with any authority being based distinctively on 
horizontal networking, and it often substituted public functions of the state. 
 
Media-political trends and the quality of the public spheres 
 
The re-feudalized nature of the national politics, especially in Russia, hampered 
the general mechanisms of incorporation of public opinion into political decision-
making on the national level. Another way to re-feudalize the public discussion in 
both countries is reflected in mediacratic trends (Puyu & Bodrunova 2013) – that 
is, in antidemocratic fusion of media and politics (Rose 2001: 101; Graber 2002: 
266, Oborne 2007). Several important elements of mediacratization may be 
spotted in both countries. 
 
The first one concerns media ownership. In Italy, as well as in Russia, national 
television still remains the main news medium, and this means that it also remains 
the biggest (if not the only) common point of reference for the majority of 
population (not less than 70% by various data for Russia and circa 90% in Italy, 
making this country rank #3 in top10 TV-viewing countries in the world 
Bodrunova 2010b). In both countries, though, national TV channels belong either 
to mainstream political figures (like the three private channels in Berlusconi’s 
ownership) or to their close allies. In the Russian national TV segment, the state 
control of federal channels further enhanced in 2009, as news production at REN 
TV and Pyaty Kanal was given to Russia Today, the state-owned Russian foreign 
broadcasting channel (Harding 2009), and in 2011 as ‘Yury Kovalchuk, a co-owner 
of Bank Rossiya and a longtime Putin associate, purchased a 25 percent stake in 
Pervy Kanal, Russia’s main television broadcaster’ (Freedom House 2012). This 
creates conflicts of interests, but there are no legal mechanisms in both Russian 
and Italian media law to prevent further buying-out of TV shares.  
 
The second most politically relevant media segment, namely the national quality 
newspapers (Voltmer 2000), suffers in both countries with several similar 
features, one of which is self-censorship (Bodrunova 2010b; Os’kin 2011), and the 
other may be conceptualized as partial detachment from standing on the readers’ 
positions. In Russia, main quality newspapers are business-oriented, and several 
‘sociopolitical’ papers like Izvestia or Nezavisimaya gazeta hold, rather, a mid-
market stand, rarely challenging the political elite for their decision-making. 
Recently, notable was a slow decline of both quality newspapers and magazines, 




peaked with the closure of The Russian Newsweek, purchase of Izvestia in April 
2011 by Aram Gabrelyanov, who publishes tabloids and editorial layoffs at 
Kommersant-Vlast magazine during the protests. Their place in agenda-setting, 
quite low for a long time already, was eventually captured by business news outlets 
like Kommersant, Vedomosti, or RBC Daily. In Italy, the situation in national 
newspapers would seem healthier thanks to La Repubblica and L’Espresso who 
are to represent the left-centrist positions. But as our earlier research shows 
(Bodrunova 2012), the political press in the country is still very much focused upon 
the 20-year-old Christian Democrat – Communist cleavage, and this idea is 
perpetually thrown into the mediated public sphere, which shapes the discussion 
in national papers by placing the newspaper positions within practically one-
dimensional left/right spectrum, be it economic, ecological, migration, or other 
agenda that otherwise might have created its own splits in the newspaper 
discourse. Plus the language of the newspapers in Italy does not favor a wider 
readership, even if it may contrast with ‘light’ content (Urina 2005). Moreover, 
according to Censis, during the ‘first big crisis of the information society’ in 2008-
2009 in Italy, data on regular readership shows significant and rapid decline – 
from 51% of population over 14 to in 2007 to 34,5% in 2009, while almost 40% of 
the population do not read papers at all and 53% do not use Internet, thus creating 
the specifically Italian press divide (Censis; cf Pratellesi 2009), and the market did 
not recover until today. In Russia, in the evaluation by Vasily Gatov, Vice President 
of the World Association of Newspapers, the audience of the quality dailies 
constituted in the late 2000s less than 1% of the population, namely ‘the Facebook 
million’ people that were considered the audience to compete for quality (mostly 
business) media. 
 
Other trends include the growing amount of politainment on national TV 
(Sorrentino 2006; Mazzoleni & Sfardini 2010; Smirnova 2010), personalization of 
‘top’ political discourse with its simultaneous de-politicization, when national 
leaders participate in stunts (events organized especially to be televised) outside 
current political agenda (of ecological, personal-developmental, sportive, lifestyle 
nature), excessive intrusion of state into financial support of regional media (Lopez 
2007: 7; Martynov & Os’kin 2007), political pressure upon editorship, and unequal 
electoral coverage on major national channels (partly due to the incumbency of 
candidates). 
 
All these trends show lack of political demand for alternative information in the 
public sphere as one of the democratic premises (Dahl 1979). This, in turn, lowers 
the quality of the mainstream public spheres, which is felt by the growing number 
of its participants. 
 
The recent trends in media systems development: fragmentation of TV 
audience and growth of Internet media 
 
As many other media markets, both Italian and Russian media markets have gone 




through meaningful transformations in the second half of the 2000s. In terms of 
efficacy of the public sphere, three tendencies seem relevant.  
 
The first was gradual decline (for similar trends in newspaper consumption, often 
referred to as ‘fading’) of mainstream TV consumption, especially among younger 
audiences. For Russia, according to Sarah Oates of the University of Maryland, a 
decline of consumption of ‘federal’ channels could be a sign of a fundamental shift 
in the loyalty and attention of key segments of the Russian news audience (Oates 
2012), so that it allowed speculations upon a ‘post-broadcast phase’ in the Russian 
media system (Strukov 2012) and of possible decrease of social solidarity 
(Gabowitch 2012: 214). For Italy, the corrosion of the television ‘duopoly’ between 
the state RAI and Berlusconi’s Mediaset was a bit less evident and connected not 
only with the press divide (Censis 2011) but also with proliferation of Murdoch’s 
Sky platform which begin to ‘eat out’ circa 1,5% of audience of the big players a 
year in the mid-2000s (Gangemi 2006). 
 
The second tendency, made of an array of smaller trends, is the growth of Internet 
penetration and trajectories of development of Internet media. First of all, Internet 
penetration played a role in the corrosion of the TV audience in the younger and 
well-educated strata with a higher income. Then, it is the digital divide that has 
complicated cleavage lines as opposed to just generational ones, with income and 
exposure to technologies playing the key role in stratification (Censis 2011; 
Galitsky & Petuhova 2012). This can partly explain why counter-spheres, with their 
‘media junctions’, formed not just online but across online/offline splits.  
 
In Russia, Internet users get news almost equally from TV and online sources 
(Lebedev 2012; Oates 2012), and one can additionally suggest an inverse 
proportional relation between average credibility for TV and amount of online 
news consumption with the underlying factor of income; as in 2012 TV credibility 
was 62,5% for pensioners and 36% for ‘high resource employees’ (Galitsky & 
Petuhova 2012: 12). In Italy in general, despite the evident TV-dependence of the 
whole nation and growing general trust to media in the times of financial recession 
(up to 59%), indices of TV credibility are lower. While indices for ‘some trust’/‘tend 
to trust’ stay mostly below the EU average and rank from 35% for TV in general 
(for 2012, see Eurobarometer 2012: 19) to over 60% for TV/TV news (Edelman 
2012: 16), making Italy a country that goes contrary to the general EU trend in 
media trust (Eurobarometer 2011a: 15; Eurobarometer 2011b: 16), the indices for 
‘trust a great deal’ to TV or traditional media on the whole are even worse and do 
not always reach one third of TV viewers. The average figure for that spotted by 
several researches like Eurobarometer, Censis, Edelman and other agencies is circa 
25%; in several strata (often described like ‘informed public’), while Internet media 
(with the exclusion of blogs) have already gained a higher credibility than 
traditional media (Edelman 2012: 14-16; Eurobarometer 2012: 19, 21). 
Interestingly, public trust to government, in Edelman’s assessment, shows similar 
figures: 73% of the ‘informed public’ respondents do not trust government leaders 




(that is, only 27% or fewer do trust them) (Edelman 2012: 20). 
 
One more distinct feature of Internet media spheres before 2009 that we need to 
mention was a special structure of online/offline parallelism of media outlets in 
both countries. Unlike most European countries, Russia and Italy from 1994-2003 
demonstrated growth of online-only media with significant social impact. Thus, in 
Italy, 1997-2003 were the years of spurred growth of webzines (in both quantity 
and quality); among those, the famous LaVoce.info, the regions-uniting Vivacity, 
and 1380 others of which local news portals were the biggest group (Bodrunova 
2007: 52–53). By 2005, though, almost all of them perished, as they could not 
compete with traditional media getting online, and the online/offline structural 
parallelism became much higher. In Russia, the number of projects was much 
lower, but in 1999-2000 most Russian online-only business-oriented news media 
existing until today like Gazeta.ru, SMI.ru, Utro.ru, Lenta.ru appeared in between 
State Duma and presidential election campaigns – but today no one would call 
them business news outlets, as by 2009 they turned to the ‘traditional’ news 
palette. By 2006, the aggregate revenue generated by online media segment 
reached European levels of circa 2% and was growing rapidly; this period ended 
with 2008 ‘heired’ elections, Russian–Georgian armed conflict, and the outburst of 
economic recession. So, by 2009, both countries had significant experience in 
democratic development of online ‘media junctions’.  
 
Another very important trend was the rapid and practically full penetration of 
social networks: Facebook in Italy and Vkontakte (and several others) in Russia. In 
Italy, in the late 2000s, as stated by Audiweb, offline media gave up to tech giants 
and social networks: in 2011, there was no offline media website among top10 
Italian web portals, Facebook being the second after Google. As to the politically 
relevant media within social networks, the second-biggest left-leaning newspaper 
La Repubblica and Beppe Grillo’s blog-casting have been 3rd and 5th (Socialbakers 
2012a). In Russia, as in Italy, both offline and online media are forced out of top10 
online news outlets, besides one or two websites of best-selling Russian quality and 
mid-market dailies (Medialogia 2012). Social media showed extreme growth 
during the last three years, the leaders being Russian: Vkontakte (‘In contact’) with 
over 110 million Russian-language accounts, Odnoklassniki (‘Classmates’). They 
were just recently joined by Facebook, with over 9 million by September 2012 
(Socialbakers 2012b), but this ‘Facebook millions’ being ‘generally of the wealthier, 
travelling, cosmopolitan variety, having foreign friends and tending to live in 
Moscow and St. Petersburg’ (Ioffe 2010). Today, Internet in Russia, as 
commentators note, is influenced by the distortions of the offline media system 
and can be better understood via the notion of national media models rather than 
via the normative Western ideas of the universal democratic impact of the web 
(Oates 2008; Alexanyan 2009; Gorny 2009).  
 
The third trend in the media system was relative stability of oppositional media 
and their audiences in both countries, thus providing a chance for its most radical 




critics to label them as ‘a part of the system but inversed’, even if ‘oppositional 
media’ in Russia and Italy mean different things replicating the structure of the 
respective party-political spreads. In Russia, the oppositional media reflect the 
major split between ‘systemic’ and ‘non-systemic’ opposition, namely those who 
constantly get into parliament (and are considered by the ‘non-systemic’ 
opposition to be toothless and inherently support the ruling party) and those who 
have no chance to surpass the 7-% threshold and thus can’t have real influence 
upon decision-making but are believed to represent a bigger share of the 
population than the election results reflect due to many reasons including election 
fraud. Thus, in Russia, Moscow-based ‘non-systemic’ oppositional media Ekho 
Moskvy radio station (even if there are doubts for its ‘real-oppositional’ status), 
Radio Liberty, Novaya gazeta, The New Times, and several online news and 
discussion outlets created a field of reference, even if relatively small, for criticism 
of the political mainstream.  
 
In Italy, rotation of left/right in power is much more evident, and thus ‘non-
systemic’ media are quite marginal even in comparison with other political press 
which itself has low circulation figures. The split of the newspaper market reflects 
the major cleavage very clearly (Bodrunova 2012), especially in case of national 
papers and political magazines where the stable point of criticism was represented 
by Editoriale L’Espresso titles, mainly La Repubblica, even if this paper was also 
marked by some ‘weathercock’ behavior regarding its right-wing opponents: if 
Berlusconi or his allies expressed left views, the opposing La Repubblica and 
political press would prefer to express right views than to agree with opponents. 
 
‘Degraded democracies’: ‘Antipolitica’ and ‘Second Stagnation’ 
 
The public perception of the unfinished democratic transition is well documented 
by polling by independent polling agencies. In one poll, the Russian society split 
almost 1:1 in answering ‘yes/no’ upon existence of the Russian democracy 
(41%/48%) (Zircon 2010). In a poll of 2009 with scaled questions, though, only 4% 
of Russians were sure of the existence of Russian democracy, and 33% more 
considered it partly established (Levada Centre 2009). These figures strikingly 
resemble the latest available Eurobarometer data for satisfaction of the quality of 
democracy in Italy (2004): 3% only think they are satisfied with the state of 
democracy in Italy, and 33% more are fairly satisfied (Eurobarometer 2004). At 
the same time, the social demand for democratic development is approximately 
two times higher in the core of the ‘first Russia’ – 57 to 62% (higher education, 18-
29 years), being two times lower in the opposing strata – 32 to 35% (low-level 
education, over 60) (Yurgens 2008: 54); by another poll, the first figure is 
characteristic for the whole Russian audience and is quite stable, drifting 2005 to 
2009 between 56% and 67% (Levada Centre 2009).  
 
The dissatisfaction with the current political-communicative climate was reflected 
in critical (or even pejorative) social labeling of particular events or the whole 




political situations. Thus, in Russia, the post exchanges by Vladimir Putin and 
Dmitry Medvedev were called ‘rokirovki’ (‘castlings’). The personalized, ‘manual’ 
styles of ruling by the national leaders were called, respectively, ‘Berlusconism’ and 
‘Putinism’ (Pyontkovsky 2000; Bodrunova 2011b). Among public labeling of the 
whole political situations as emasculated and inefficient in terms of politics (and 
communication), one could spot two labels. ‘Antipolitica’ has, at least since 2000, 
been the word widely used to mark the complex drawbacks of the political process 
and ‘degraded democracy’ of Italy (Mastropaolo 2000, 2005; Campus 2006; Mele 
2012; Travaglio 2012). In Russia, public labeling of the 2000s has run into 
deliberate attempts of pro-state media to label the 1990s as ‘evil 1990s’ and the 
2000s as ‘stability years’. But despite of, indeed, relatively stable performance of 
Russia throughout the economic recession, the public labeling of the political 
situation popular in liberal circles of Moscow and St. Petersburg was ‘Vtoroy 
zastoy’, or ‘Second Stagnation’, after Leonid Brezhnev’s last years in power known 
today as the Stagnation. 
 
 
Mediated public counter-spheres: a plea for a return of substance 
 
‘Scomparsa dei fatti’ as the common frame of the counter-spheres 
 
The basic notion that, to our mind, fostered the formation of a large alternative 
public domain was the ‘disappearance of facts’ (‘scomparsa dei fatti’) in the 
mainstream public sphere, as Italian journalist Marco Travaglio put it (Travaglio 
2006). The shared plea of the participants in both countries was the return of 
factual basis and socially-, not politically- or elite-oriented interpretations of 
events and agendas. The many problematic zones in both societies that did not get 
enough critical reviewing by the mainstream media (especially TV), as well as new 
urban- and online-based lifestyles, formed alternative agenda for the counter-
spheres. Existing left/right or systemic/non-systemic cleavages based on 
polarization towards the same agendas had almost inevitably to be rejected or 
transformed. Speaking in terms of political spectrum, the counter-spheres 
provided a second (or multiple) axis (axes) to the one-dimensional political 
polarization of mainstream media and politics. 
 
Hybridization of the media systems, thus, in accordance with Chadwick’s (2011) 
theoretical assumptions, was not only technical; it also had a political dimension. 
The ‘opportunity gaps’ for the counter-spheres appeared throughout the media 
segments and practices, including online-only projects and convergent projects 
like online TV (Annozero multiplatform programme in Italy, Dozhd’ online+cable 
TV channel in Russia) and radio (website of Ekho Moskvy in Russia, Passaparola 
podcasts and editorial videocasting in Italy). 
 
The alternative deliberative spaces and ‘media junctions’ in them could constitute 
an alternative to the mainstream if only they had a critical amount of audience – at 




least above statistical significance. For the 140-million Russia, several million 
people exchanging information and opinions within a communicative milieu would 
work; for Italy, a 3-4 times smaller figure, one million, would be enough. We argue 
that it is these millions of people who de-virtualized in 2011-2012 at protest rallies. 
 
The common features of the counter-spheres in Russia and Italy were the 
following. First, they had similar composition in terms of who/what constituted 
the ‘media junctions’. These included: 
 
- established oppositional media of all types and across platforms, e.g. Ekho 
Moskvy radio, Novaya Gazeta newspaper and Grani.ru discussion portal in 
Russia, La Repubblica in Italy; 
- alternative-agenda media in metropolitan and regional urban areas 
established in 2000s, like Dozhd’ online TV station, Bolshoy gorod city 
magazine or Snob project in Russia, Il Fatto Quotidiano newspaper, 
Annozero and Servizio Pubblico TV-based projects, or Passaparola 
multimedia project in Italy; 
- business newspapers, since in both countries they tended to have a 
(left)liberal stance rather than a conservative one. In times of protest 
between 2011-2012, especially in Russia, further anti-government 
polarization took place in editorial opinions expressed in Kommersant or 
Vedomosti in Russia, Il Sole 24 Ore in Italy, as the papers followed their 
polarizing readership; 
- blogs (especially in Italy), including comedian and politician Beppe Grillo’s 
personal blog, Piovono Rane and Byoblu blogs and several others in Italy; 
solicitor Alexey Navalny’s blog in Russia; the blog authors became mediated 
(or, rather, ‘bloggiated’) public figures; 
- projects in social networks (like Informazione Libera or Altra Notizia in 
Italy) or social networks in their national making on the whole, like 
Facebook in Russia where a phenomenon of ‘exodus from Livejournal’ blog 
platform took place approximately a year before the outbreak of protests, 
making Facebook a new virtual milieu for ‘Runet intelligentsia’ (see below); 
- creators of online media texts of a mostly critical, analytical, or even artistic 
nature. In Russia, a return to traditional cultural textocentricism was 
spotted in how journalists of online-only media, famous writers, and experts 
were the main opinion leaders of the ‘For fair elections’ protest movement 
(Bodrunova & Litvinenko 2013). In Italy, several ‘big figures’ of journalism 
like Michele Santorò, Milena Gabanelli, or Marco Travaglio constituted the 
activist group that created projects of critical journalism in search of facts 
and real issues and organized events like the internationally-supported 
demonstration for information rights in 2010; 
- constellations of interconnected portals that included think tanks, 
universities, thematic sites, blogs, and news portals.  
 
Thus, in Italy, the counter-sphere is centered around several journalists and 




politicians of a new formation serving as ‘junctions’ of the sphere and incarnating 
the convergent nature of today’s journalism, as well as around several Facebook 
projects with distinctive purpose of reconstructing the free flow of ‘true facts’. In 
Russia, it was centered more around convergent media outlets themselves, several 
activists like Navalny, Olga Romanova, Yevgenia Chirikova and Sergey Udaltzov, 
and Facebook itself after the ‘exodus from Livejournal’. It is evident that in both 
countries the cleavage between mainstream and counter-spheres grew mainly in 
metropolitan and large urban areas, where ‘new’, business, and online media were 
available to the majority of politically and socially active audience. This raises the 
question whether regions, especially more rural areas, were really involved into the 
process of fragmentation of the public sphere in a way similar to that in big cities. 
 
Second, formation of the counter-spheres had a ‘wave’ character. In Italy, a rise of 
the second big generation of webzines appeared in 2009-2010; they were 
accompanied by blogs of today’s top 10 in Italy and Facebook-based aggregation 
projects named above. Offline, this was supported by appearance of new print 
media, TV and radio shows, personal communication of journalists at press 
conferences, and book publishing in newly-created publishing houses. In Russia, 
several ‘alternative journalism’ online-only and online/offline projects appeared, 
bearing features of fiction, blogging, and cinematographic style in genre structure 
(Russkiy Reportyor, Openspace, Slon, Snob, Bolshoy gorod, F5, The Village, 
Bumaga and others), and Facebook suddenly became an attractive space for the 
most active bloggers from the ‘elite’ blog platform – Livejournal. An ‘exodus to 
Facebook’, as it became known, began as a growing wave in 2010, and by 2012 
most part of the top 2000 Livejournal bloggers had their accounts connected to 
Facebook where their main writing activity was now performed. Another part of 
the ‘wave’ was rapid polarization (against the ruling elite) of the national business 
papers and online news outlets like Lenta.ru, which may be explained by following 
their readership, even if partly sacrificing to it insider connections within the 
ruling mainstream. 
 
Third, a new (‘anti-mediacratic’) form of fusion of media and political activities 
may be traced. To prove this, we draw the examples of Beppe Grillo, Italian comic, 
journalist, one of the world’s top 10 bloggers and founder of ‘MoVimento 5 Stelle’ 
(‘5-Star MoVement’), as well as Alexey Navalny, Russian solicitor and blogger, 
whose public activities started with blog-publishing of inner reports of state and 
private monopolies, with access to them obtained via minority shareholding, and 
lead to creation, i. a., of ‘RosPil’ anti-corruption crowd-funded project. The 
activities of both bloggers blurred borders between mainstream political practices 
(like creating a party, taking part in local elections, or entering a coordination 
committee of opposition), grassroots activism (creating movements, socially-
oriented projects etc.), opinion leading (‘publizistik’ and criticism) and media 
production (blogging). Not only ‘mediated activism’ (reposting, sharing, liking) but 
also creating content and activist practices were a distinctive feature of the 
counter-spheres, personified by approximately a dozen people in each country.  




Fourth, the counter-spheres concentrated around an alternative agenda, forming 
online/offline networks of ‘junctions’ that included think tanks, parties or 
movements and their websites, single-issue activist/project portals, adherent 
media resources, personal or campaigning blogs, and other media outlets. They 
were also linked to Facebook communities. We will take the micro-network around 
Libertiamo.it as an example, which connects to Gianfranco Fini’s ‘Future and 
Liberty for Italy’ and its youth part ‘Generazione Italia’, two liberal think tanks 
(Center for Liberal Studies and Bruno Leoni Insitute), LiberiLibri publishing 
house, projects such as GayLib (right-wing gay community), La Valle del Siele 
(market-oriented regional agriculture free of state control) and Disarming the 
Green (discrediting the typical green agenda), a finian (that of Fini’s followers’ who 
became known as ‘finians’) news portal Il Futurista, two other notable broadly-
liberal news portals and several blogs including opinion blogs of liberal-critical 
stance (Chicago Blog, Noise from Amerika) and blogs by MPs and high-profile 
activists. In Russia, a much lower number of alternative-agenda media appeared, 
and they were divided into two broad groups: the one without connections to think 
tanks and the one with them, and the first group (mentioned above as ‘alternative 
journalism’) was, in public mind of the above-mentioned ‘first Russia’ of Moscow 
and St. Petersburg, the real ‘new’ or ‘alternative’ media. The alternative agenda, for 
those, could be any that went beyond traditional left/right cleavages in politics, 
economics, and social life, as media discourses based upon such traditional 
cleavages are perceived as emasculated and mediacratically distorted. In such an 
agenda, at least three features are expected to show up. First, the agenda is issue-
oriented, as ‘search for real facts’ creates not just factual reporting but produces 
stories and raises issues within reshaped understanding of relative importance of 
problematized areas, which makes ecology or inter-European relations form new 
social divisions. This is why, second, this agenda tends to avoid traditional 
politicization while politicizing previously non-political agenda by turning, e.g., 
reporting on arts into social critique via various means, from selection of events to 
drawing lines of argument. And third, this agenda addresses individual levels of 
relevance instead of addressing feelings of national or territorial unity. This, in 
turn, shifts foci of agenda building, say, from ‘youth policy’ to ‘parenting issues’ or 
‘kids’ life’.  
 
 
Growth of alternative agenda: quantitative analysis of website menus 
 
‘Alternativity’ of the newly-created news sources is quite difficult to prove, even if 
it seems evident for a constant viewer. But as we told above, the new agenda and 
news judgment principles showed up in editorial gatekeeping and selection of 
news; this inevitably results into new configurations of editorial attention to events 
and current affairs, that is, into new issue structuring of the content. This reflects 
in the basic structuring of news output, e.g. in newspaper sections or website 
menus. 
 




To show that the ‘waves of new journalism’ in the two countries really differed 
from their predecessors, we will look at the basic level of the structure of online 
news sources – that is, at website menus. Our basic hypothesis is that the 
traditional menu structure of the newspaper of the 19thand 20thcenturies (‘news, 
politics, economics, society, culture, sports’, maybe ‘world news’ and ‘opinion’), 
will shift more on portals of 2008-2013 to (or be enriched by) urban life, global 
news, lifestyle topics, protection of rights, ecology, and issues (as complimentary to 
news), and this trend will be observed in both states. 
 
We will compare four basic groups of portals that contain journalistic content: 1) 
online representations of the newspapers that had been established before the 
collapse of the previous regime (1993 for Italy and 1991 for Russia); 2) 
regional/local webzines of 1994-2007; 3) regional/local webzines of 2008-2013; 4) 
‘alternative’ media portals chosen separately for each country (see below). Our 
operational hypothesis is that the menu structure will gradually shift from Group 1 
to Group 4 towards more ‘alternative agenda’ tags; it is particularly interesting to 
know whether local websites between 2008-2013 support the ‘wave’ of alternative 
websites (characteristic mostly for capitals and big cities) on the local level (by 
Group 3).  
 
To show the shifts in editorial decision making, three mechanisms were chosen. 
First, most ‘weighty’ (addressed more often than others) menu entries had to be 
defined in the samples, as they show editorial priorities in choosing overall agenda 
frameworks in groups of websites and help detect inertia in ‘menu thinking’. To 
define ‘weight’ of menu tags, tag lists were created (44 to 48 tags for Italy and 64 
tags for Russia) based on all tags met within the respective datasets; similar entries 
were collected into bigger tags: e.g. ‘charity and activism’ included ‘charities’, 
‘NGOs’, ‘voluntary work’, ‘activism’, ‘associations’, ‘solidarity’, and ‘community 
activities’. Several entries had to be slightly changed according to their shape 
within particular datasets; e.g. ‘books & literature’ could transform into ‘books’ and 
‘media & literature’. Then an individual website’s menu tags were assigned 
numbers from the biggest on; thus, in a four-tag menu, ‘latest news’ would be 
given 44, ‘politics’ 43, ‘economics’ 42, and ‘sports’ 41. Then, the assigned figures 
were weighted against the number of tags in the respective menu; that is, ‘latest 
news’ would receive 11 and ‘economics’ 10.5 as their final ‘weights’ for this website. 
These ‘weights’ were not additionally weighted against circulation, regional/local 
status or distribution area, as we looked at news judgment rather than at 
newspaper/website impact upon readers. All ‘weights’ were summed up for their 
tags, and the 20 most ‘weighty’ tags were ranged 1-20 in Appendix 1 (see ‘Most 
“weighty” menu entries’).  
 
Second, probable menu lists had to be generated for the samples based on whether 
menu tags occupy more or less stable slots in the lists, as it shows relative 
importance of particular issues for various groups of websites. To know just the 
‘weight’ of a tag is not enough, as we also need to spot its place in the menu and 




whether there is movement of some tags to positions closer to #1, as entries closer 
to it are generally considered more important; this is why (quite rare) websites 
with alphabetic order of menu tags were excluded from our analysis. We took the 
threshold of 29-30% of all cases for one entry in getting to the same slot (e.g. #3) 
for smaller datasets and 25-26% for bigger datasets as ‘stably getting to #3’; in 
cases when there was no stable getting to the same slot, average positions were 
calculated (the biggest and the smallest number excluded, all the rest taken as 
mean), they are marked as ‘ave’ in Appendix 1 (see ‘Probable menu structures’). 
Probability coefficients were not calculated, as it needs more discussion on what 
these could be; for us, it was enough to calculate the actual slot distributions within 
the datasets, as it tells a lot about the actual shifts in agendas. 
 
Third, it is not enough to range the ‘weighted’ tags to show their real weight, as 
ranging 1 to 20 creates a false feeling of a regular step between entries. To show 
large gaps in individual ‘weights’ of the menu entries (up to over 10 times), Wordle 
representation is used (see Pic. 1 and 2). 
 
Sampling and website selection 
 
Unfortunately, there are no exhaustive collections of regional/local news portals 
(or even newspapers) available via online means for any of the two countries. For 
Italy, we used manually double-checked data from the national audit bureau of 
circulation for 2010, but data on, e.g., local newspapers had to be seriously 
augmented (at least for 2/3) from six other online lists of regional news media, 
including AgoraIt.tv Lab, Giornali locali project, and Wikipedia. After additional 
research, we could estimate that our list is practically exhaustive in terms of 
representation of regions as well as of circulation levels (regional, provincial, local, 
city, community/district papers). 
 
For Italy, over 500 portals were checked manually. For Group 1 (newspapers), 89 
portals were chosen for analysis; to check the difference between papers of the 
First and Second Italian Republic, the Group was analyzed in aggregate and then 
divided into two sub-groups, local newspapers of 1664-1992 of foundation (48 
cases) and those of 1993-2009 (41 cases). In several cases, one paper represents 
several ‘publishing units’ (with the same publisher and menu structure), like in the 
case of La Gazzetta di Bari with versions for neighboring towns, or several portals 
with the same template (and, thus, the copied menu structure), like in case of 
papers by Editoriale L’Espresso or Dmedia Group; so the coverage of the data set is 
actually bigger than 100 publications, not 89. Each of such ‘representative’ 
newspapers represent not over 5 other papers; we consider such ‘representation’ 
legitimate, since if we were to introduce all-the-same menus in the datasets, the 
picture of editorial preferences would be distorted towards just one model; 
instead, we are interested in a diversity of approaches, rather than in depicting  
certain editorial models. Thus, for over 40 newspapers of Dmedia Group we have 8 
newspapers, 4 in each sub-dataset. 




Groups 2 and 3 together consist of 165 portals (74 and 91, respectively). In 
Appendix 1 (1), they are analyzed first all together (to see the difference between 
print newspapers of the Group 1 and online-only media of Italy), and then in 
Groups. Representativeness of the Groups is high, as they cover all the regions of 
Italy and were selected from the biggest online collection of local digital media at 
AgoraIt.tv (contained 375 portals marked ‘local digital media’). All ‘local digital 
media’ were checked manually by us, and a half of 375 were either without menus 
suitable for analysis, non-renewing, non-working, non-existent, were content 
aggregators, or did not contain any sign of the date of establishment.  
 
Group 4 was made up of the websites marked separately as ‘liberal sources’ by 
ArcoIris.tv and/or linked to Informazione Libera page on Facebook from 2011-
2012 (24 portals altogether). There was no intersection among any two sets of the 
four.  
 
For Russia, we used Liveinternet ratings of media websites for Russia of early 2013 
(liveinternet.ru/rating/ru/media). 3666 portals were listed (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg excluded), but with much broader scope for inclusion than in Italian 
lists, as the list contained city portals, official administration websites, TV and 
radio portals, regional news agencies, online town guides, and local news media. 
83 cities were listed, which corresponds to the number of Russian regions (83 
without Moscow and St. Petersburg), with 44 portals a city on average. Of the 83 
cities, 15 (18% of the city sample) possessed over 60 portals; of them, at least 50% 
were looked at; of the resting 68 cities (82%), all the portals were looked at at the 
primary stage. Of the list of 3666, we manually searched not less than 1400 portals 
(circa 40%), as we tried to exclude TV and radio, news agencies and non-
journalistic websites while looking at the titles already. Of those opened, 233 
regional news portals were selected for analysis. Though they represent only 6,4% 
of the whole ‘media’ content at the list, the selection is representative for news 
portals, as it is practically exhaustive for news & issues portals of those listed. Of 
those, 49 belong to Group 1, 44 to Group 2, and 140 to Group 3. Group 4 (23 
portals altogether) consists of Moscow- and St. Petersburg-based media mentioned 
by respondents of the survey upon protest media diets conducted in 2012 
(Bodrunova & Litvinenko 2013) and regional and local portals named by two 
experts (editors from Moscow and St. Petersburg), analyzed both separately and in 
aggregate (see Appendix 1). We also drew as examples two portals sponsored by 
sources close to the political establishment (Dni.ru and Vz.ru) that try to be part of 
the online political discussion and are created to counter-balance the deliberative 
potential of the liberal portals, for us to see the ‘inertia of thinking’ in pro-
establishment political journalism reflected in their menus’ closeness to the classic 
set of ‘politics, economics etc.’. 
 




Interpretation of results 
 
Italy. As expected, there is a dramatic difference between local papers and portals, 
from one side, and alternative-agenda portals, from the other side. Groups 1, 2 and 
3 are dominated by latest news and sports. Newspapers show traditional 
economics, politics, culture, and regional news as their priorities in top10 menu 
entries. The only difference between newspapers of the First and Second Republic 
is appearance of ‘alternative’ agenda in newer-established papers in cases of 
‘education’ and ‘nature & ambience’, while more traditional ‘work’ and ‘house’ slide 
down to under top 10. As to the Group 2 and 3, ‘local news’ join ‘latest news’ and 
‘sports’ in the preferred menu, and there is minimal difference in the top 12 
between 1994-2007 and 2007-2012 portals. This tells us that in the case of Italy 
our hypothesis of support of the ‘liberal wave’ in local news sources is not 
supported. But, this shows a major cleavage between the ‘new-wave’ agenda of city 
media and the traditional news judgment of the mainstream regional editorship.  
 
In the case of Group 4, the shift in topicality was so big that even our tagging had 
to be expanded to include ‘society and family’, ‘world and globalization’, ‘justice 
and human rights’, ‘social troubles’, ‘media and regime’ (which shows that 
mediacracy as a topic is serious enough to create a separate entry in many portal 
menus), ‘environment’, or world regions including Middle East and Europe. The 
menu is much more issue-oriented and much less entertaining, as there is no ‘free 
time’/‘entertainment’ tags in thetop20 tags.  
 
As to the probable menu structure, it is worth noting that the number of menu tags 
grows in Groups 3 and 4 – from 8-9 to 11-12, and this similarity needs to be looked 
at closer in the future, as it may tell that recent local news media may easily shift to 
a more alternative agenda, as they have higher flexibility due to the adjustment to 
a habitually bigger number of menu entries. We may also spot that there are two 
menu models in the local digital media of the recent years, as there is a number of 
portals with ‘art’ as a #1 entry – that is, their overall orientation is cultural, but the 
menus are more or less ‘generalist’. This may point out to politicization of cultural 
discourse in online media. In alternative-agenda menus, there is still a clear 
reminiscence of a traditional menu, but news agenda is nation- and world-level 
oriented and is practically deprived of sports. Alternative agenda is created by 
entries 5 to 10, thus representing one way of extending a news portal menu: rather 
than highlighting events, entertainment, shows or cars, these websites extend their 
agenda to axes of political polarization alternative to left/right cleavage and 
creating critical stance by writing upon troubled world regions, social issues, or art. 
This, presumably, is a part of struggle for the return of facts in their factuality, 
rather than placing them into left/right dichotomies. 
 
Wordle visualization of the differences (Group 1, Groups 2 & 3, Group 4) is given at 
Picture 1. 
 




Picture 1. Wordle visualization of the menu tag clouds of Italian online news media: 
(A) regional and local newspapers (Group 1), (B) local digital media (Group 2 & 3) 
and (C) alternative-agenda media (Group 4) 
 
(A) Italy: Group 1, 1664-2009 years of establishment 
 
 
(B) Italy: Groups 2 & 3, 1994-2013 years of establishment 
 
 








Russia. Local media in Russia, both newspapers and portals, demonstrate striking 
unity in weights of traditional menu entries, but in a bit unusual order: 
‘economics’, ‘society’, ‘sports’, ‘culture’, ‘politics’, ‘latest news’. This marks the 
traditional orientation of Russian local newspapers (and websites probably 
following them due to inertia of thinking and traditional media practices done by 
the same people online and offline) towards argumentation and ‘publizistik’, rather 
than towards news alerts. In their menus, Russian local newspapers until today 
contain official municipality news (as often they are financed by local 
municipalities) and information on law and order, rural and agricultural news not 
found anywhere else, descriptive stories upon local land and news on local 
industries. Menu entries meaningful for the first wave of local digital media reflect 
the troublesome state of the country in 1990s – early 2000s, as they focus upon 
emergency, accidents, crime and corruption, community facilities, and health 
treatment. In the later 2000s, there are meaningful differences that may reflect 
social demand for more analytical content (within the 10 most ‘weighty’ tags) and 
movement towards international agenda (‘world news’, ‘technology’) and 
professional journalism (‘reportage and stories’). In probable menu structure, it is 
worth noting that ‘city & community’ tag is competing with ‘latest news’ for #1 
entry, and this is a clear indicator of a pool of ‘city media’ in our sample.  
 
This tag repeatedly appears on its place in all the alternative-media datasets, and 
this means that city media are, evidently, the main cluster of alternative media; 
this is where an alternative agenda mainly starts from. This means that the new 
cluster of regional urban media are ready to produce an alternative agenda, as 
metropolitan urban media models may be corrected and reproduced in regional 
cities. And this is what has actually been happening, as one may see from the list of 
11 regional news portals advised by experts, including Bumaga in St. Petersburg, 
Vladivostok3000 at the Far East, Tayga.info in Siberia, New Kaliningrad, and 
Downtown.ru in Voronezh. In their aggregate ‘weighted’ menu, traditional topics 
(‘politics’, ‘economics’) neighbor city topics (‘various sports’, ‘reportage & stories’, 
‘transport & infrastructure’, ‘cinema & TV’), ‘extended’ specialized agenda 
(‘technology’, ‘education’) and opinion building (‘opinion’, ‘analysis & issues’) in a 
nice balance. As to the metropolitan media, they openly refuse to include ‘politics’ 
into their menus, shifting towards arts and social topics close to the urban upper 
middle class, like ‘kids’ or ‘health treatment’. It is here where an oppositional 
agenda shows up (in ‘rights & freedoms’ or ‘power & state’), though 5 of 12 portals 
are specialized, of which 4 are non-political.  
 
Wordle visualization of the differences (Group 1, Groups 2 & 3, Group 4) is given at 
Picture 2. 




Picture 2. Wordle visualization of the menu tag clouds of Russian online news media: 
(A) regional and local newspapers (Group 1), (B) local digital media (Groups 2 & 3) 
and (C) alternative-agenda media (Group 4) 
 
(A) Russia: Group 1, established before 1992 
 
(B) Russia: Groups 2 & 3, 1994-2013 years of establishment 
 
(C) Russia: Groups 4, 2008-2012 years of establishment 
 




Comparative analysis. As we see, in traditional media and those local digital 
media that followed suite, Italian media were historically more focused on the 
latest news, sports and politics being all in all more news-oriented, while Russian 
media focused on regional social, economical and cultural stories being more 
publizistik-oriented. Despite this difference, the direction that the ‘new waves’ of 
alternative media took were similar, as reflected in their menu lists: the agenda 
opened towards world news, specialized extensions including arts, and topics close 
to individual level of urban life. Italian alternative media went further on the way 
of opening to second and third axes of political agenda, while Russian media went 
more towards social critique. But both lists contain ‘world news’, ‘national news’, 
‘media’(!), ‘city & community’, ‘analysis & issues’, ‘opinion/forecasts’, ‘science’, 
‘arts’ and ‘education’. Thus, our main hypothesis is fully supported. As to the 
second hypothesis, the process is a bit differently shaped in the two countries. 
Italian alternative websites are mostly regional in their provenience but are 
oriented often more to national and world agenda in opposition to local media, 
thus creating the alternative ‘wave’ on the local level and showing potential to 
greater extension of agenda; Russian websites in regions, though, already combine 
a mixture of traditional, local, urban and ‘opinionated’ topics, thus showing that 





Results of our situational analysis and content analysis provide, to our viewpoint, 
two sets of implications.  
 
Situational analysis of the two cases allows speculation upon possible indicators in 
media & political areas that would suggest the forthcoming formation of a ‘big’, 
‘cross-cutting’, or ‘generalist’ (non-specialized around a topic or social trauma) 
counter-sphere. These could be: 
 drops of trust to mainstream television and refusal of TV as of the main 
information source;  
 critical rates of Internet penetration and, more important, critical amount of 
use of social networks in terms of ‘online population’ share;  
 a wave of rise of urban ‘advanced lifestyle’ print and online media;  
 a wave of rise of alternative-agenda media, including regional news portals, 
with ‘extension’ of agenda to topics breaking off from traditional left/right 
deliberation; rhetoric of ‘search for true facts / real life’ in the foundation of 
new media outlets; 
 fusion of individual media production and activism. 
 
Following the thought of media-based public spheres that are formed throughout 
the mediated milieus, we could spot the constellations of ‘media junctions’ and 
‘waves’ of new journalism in Italy and Russia of 2008-2012. We also described the 
‘wave’ character of the rise of the counter-spheres, their orientation to ‘real facts’ 




and person-appealing, issue-based and newly-politicized nature, and its direct 
connection to mediacratic processes on national level.  
 
Our content analysis provides just one example of how cleavages in news flows 
may be detected. What we have tried to show was the changing nature of news 
judgment in the newly-formed counter-spheres. Our first conclusion is that 
diversification of deliberative climate was strikingly similar in terms of the general 
split (international vs. national, community vs. national, analysis vs. news, arts 
and education vs. ‘just culture’), but took differing routes in terms of how the 
traditional menus were extended or changed. Thus, in Italy, alternative media 
went towards creation of additional axes in right/left cleavages, while in Russia 
general politicization of non-political topics and issues took place. This reflects the 
differences in the quality and structure of political competition mentioned above 
(rotation of right/left in Italy and a long-time split between ‘systemic’ and ‘non-
systemic’ opposition in Russia). 
 
The second conclusion may seem a bit ahead-of-events but still important. The 
matter is that the communicative milieus belonging to the counter-spheres tend to 
close up the same way as mainstream media do, thus breaking the bridges between 
the two discourses via alternation of agenda, expressing rigid opinions, and acting 
in a way that often ‘parallels’ or substitutes state-funded institutions. This social 
cleavage, which we observe, needs to be carefully described in detail and studied 
further. Today, we already can name several indicators of formation of such 
counter-spheres of ‘generalist’ nature, very dissimilar to ‘traditional’ counter-
spheres based on subculture, hobby, or political radicalism.  
 
For the purposes of this article, it is enough to show similar trends in the 
formation of new social and communicational cleavages. For further research, one 
will need to estimate the (anti-)democratic potential of the counter-spheres 
forming today. If we consider them media-constructed and nation-wide, general 
criteria for democratic quality of media in a political system may be applicable to 
assess whether the formation of the counter-spheres rises or lowers the democratic 
quality of the ‘big’ national public spheres. One of these criteria, as formulated by 
Dahl, is alternative information sourcing potential (Dahl 1979; Voltmer 2000). 
Another criterion would be political inclusiveness, e.g. political involvement 
parameters’ rates for the counter-spheres in comparison to the overall population 
rates. The third would be the connection between the mainstream and alternative 
public spheres – judged, for example, by studying agenda flows and opinion 
sharing. The reconstructed counter-spheres need to be evaluated against these 
criteria, and parameters of detecting of such processes need to be suggested, in 
order to be able to detect as soon as possible the rises and drops of efficacy of the 
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 Local newspapers’  
(1664-2009) portals 
Local newspapers’  
(1664-1992) portals  
Local newspapers’  
(1993-2009) portals 
Digital media with local 
focus, 1994-2013 
Digital media with local 
focus, 1994-2007 
Digital media with local 
focus, 2008-2013 
Alternative-agenda  
news portals, 2008-2012 
Most ‘weighty’ menu entries 
1 Latest news Latest news Latest news Latest news Latest news Sports Economics 
2 Sports Sports Sports Sports Sports Latest news Politics 
3 Economics Regional news  Economics Local news Local news Local news Culture 
4 Shows&Performance Economics Politics Politics Politics Politics World and Globalization 
5 Local news Shows&Performance Culture Shows&Performance Shows&Performance Events Latest news 
6 Culture Local news Shows&Performance Culture Regional news Shows&Performance Sports 
7 Regional news Culture Local news Events Culture Culture Society&Family 
8 Politics Work&Career Regional news Economics Society Economics Science&Technology 
9 Work&Career House Education Society Economics Society Opinion&Issues 
10 House Shopping Nature&Ambience Regional news Opinion&Issues Regional news Justice&Human rights 
11 Shopping World news Society Opinion&Issues Travel&Tourism Opinion&Issues National news 
12 World news National news Work&Career Health Events Health Other 
13 Society Politics House Travel&Tourism Work&Career Cooking&Eating Shows&Music 
14 Education Cars Health Nature&Ambience Nature&Ambience Travel&Tourism Environment 
15 National news Events Crime Work&Career Health Miscellaneous Social troubles 
16 Opinion&Issues Travel and Tourism Opinion&Issues Cooking&Eating Free time Nature&Ambience Health 
17 Events Society Miscellaneous Education Education Art Education 
18 Cars Opinion&Issues Shopping Art Cooking&Eating Work&Career Media&Regime 
19 Nature&Ambience Education Free time Miscellaneous World news Education Europe 
20 Health Free time Events World news Art Other Middle East & World Regions 
Probable menu structures 
 Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % 
1 Latest news 1 48 Latest news 1 58 Latest news 1 46 Latest news 1 55 Latest news 1 58 Latest news 1 53 National news 1 45 
2 Politics 2 42 Politics 2 45 Crime 1 100* Politics 2 33 Free time 2 38 Art 1-2 38 Latest news 1 35 
3 Economics 3 34 Economics 2-3 48 Regional news 2 44 Economics 3 29 Politics 2-3 43 Politics 2 39 Politics 1-2 48 
4 Sports 3-4 43 Sports 2-3 44 Politics 2 40 Culture 3-4 37 Events 3 35 Economics 3 32 Globalization 3 36 
5 Local news 3-4 ave Regional news 3-4 ave Economics 3 39 Events 4-5 32 Cooking&Eating 3 29 Culture 3-4 42 Society&Family 3 Ave 
6 Work 4 39 House 4 46 Work&Career 4 60 Society 4-5 31 Nature&Amb. 3-4 38 Work 4 32 Economics 3-4 41 
7 House 4 35 National news 4 33 Free time 4 50 Travel&Tourism 5 29 Travel&Tourism 4 38 Travel&Tourism 4-5 35 Culture 4-5 32 
8 Shows&Perf. 4-5 35 Local news 4-5 ave Shows&Perf. 4-5 42 Art 5-6 ave Society 4 ave Events 5 ave Education 5 33 
9 Regional news 4-5 ave Work&Career 5 46 Sports 4-5 41 Sports 6 ave Economics 4 ave Sports 6 ave Justice&Rights 6 Ave 
10 World news 4-5 ave Culture 5 31 Society 4-5 ave Local  news 6 ave Sports 5 ave Local news 6 ave Media&Regime 6 Ave 
11 Shopping 5 57 World news 5 31 Shopping 5 100 Nature 6 ave Local news 5 ave Education 6-7 44 Europe 6 Ave 
12 Culture 5 37 Performance 5 ave Culture 5 43 Education 6-7 38 Opinion&Issues 5 ave Miscellaneous 6-7 ave Health 6-7 55 




13 Society 6 ave Shopping 6 82 Local news 5 ave Work&Career 6-7 ave Culture 6 ave Shows&Perf. 7 ave M.East&Regions 6-7 Ave 
14 National news 6 ave Education 7 29 House 5 ave Opinion&Issues 7 ave Work&Career 6 ave Society 7 ave Environment 7 36 
15 Education 7 56 Events 7-8 67 Opinion&Issues 5 ave Shows&Perf. 7-8 ave Art 6 ave Nature&Amb. 7-8 30 Opinion 7 Ave 
16 Opinion&Issues 7-8 ave Society 7-8 ave Events 6 33 World news 7-8 ave Education 6-7 ave Regional news 8 ave Music&Shows 8 Ave 
17 Events 7-8 ave Cars 8 ave Education 7 73 Regional news 8 ave Shows&Perf. 7 ave Opinion&Issues 8-9 ave Science&Tech 8-9 Ave 
18 Nature&Amb. 8 38 Opinion&Issues 9 ave Nature&Amb. 8 55 Miscellaneous 9 30 Health 7 ave Other 8-9 ave Sports 9 31 
19 Health 8 31 Travel&Tourism 9-10 42 Health 8-9 60 Health 10 ave World news 7 ave Health 9 ave Other 9 Ave 
20 Cars 8-9 ave Free time 9-10 ave Miscellaneous 8-9 ave Cooking&Eating 10 ave Regional news 8 ave Cooking&Eating 11 ave Social troubles 11-12 Ave 
* - we put ‘Crime’ (‘Cronaca nera’) here on the second position, rather than of the first one, despite the fact that ‘Crime’ is placed first whenever it appears on the menu, due to the fact that it appears in just one menu model 




 Local newspapers’ portals, papers before 1992 Digital media with local focus, 1994-2013 Digital media with local focus, 1994-2007 Digital media with local focus, 2008-2013 
Most ‘weighty’ menu entries
1 Society Economics Economics Economics 
2 Economics Society Society Society 
3 Sports Sports Sports Sports 
4 Culture Politics Politics Politics 
5 Politics Culture Culture Culture 
6 Latest news Latest news Emergency&Accidents Latest news 
7 Education Emergency&Accidents Crime&Corruption Emergency&Accidents 
8 Law, Order, Persecution Analysis&Issues Latest news Analysis&Issues 
9 Emergency&Accidents Crime&Corruption Education Opinion 
10 Rural news & Agriculture Education Health treatment City&Community 
11 People City&Community Community facilities Health&Wellness 
12 History & Local studies Health&Wellness City&Community Cars Video content 
13 Official news Opinion Health&Wellness Regional news Cars 
14 Local news & Stories of the land Cars Analysis&Issues Technology Regional news 
15 Health&Wellness Regional news Cars Reportage&Stories Technology 
16 Industries & Local production Technology Video content Entertainment World news Blog content 
17 Crime&Corruption People Photo content Opinion Interviews Crime&Corruption Reportage&Stories 
18 Power&State Thematic projects Health treatment Technology People Opinion People Photo content 
19 Analysis&Issues Photo content Reportage&Stories People History & Local Studies People Education World news 
20 City&Community Power and State World news Health treatment Regional news History & Local Studies Power&State Crime&Corruption 
Probable menu structures 
 Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % 
1 Politics 1 52 Latest news 1 61 Latest news 1 70 Latest news 1 70 
2 Latest news 1 39 City&Community 1 35 City&Community 1 36 City&Community 1 34 
3 Economics 2 35 Economics 2-3 46 Politics 1 33 Politics 1-2 45 
4 History & Local studies 2-3 36 Society 3-4 45 Economics 2 32 Power&State 2 44 




5 Video content 3 38 Culture 4-5 38 Crime&Corruption 4-5 44 Economics 2-3 41 
6 City&Community 3 33 Emergency&Accidents 5 ave Culture 4-5 41 Society 3 32 
7 Power&State 3 ave Education 5-6 40 Society 5 ave Culture 4-5 37 
8 Society 3-4 33 Sports in general 5-6 36 Community facilities 5 ave Emergency&Accidents 4-5 29 
9 Rural news & Agriculture 4-5 30 Analysis&Issues 6 ave Education 5-6 39 Cars 5 ave 
10 Culture 6 26 Regional news 6 ave Health treatment 6 ave Education 5-6 42 
11 Crime&Corruption 7 ave Health treatment 6-7 ave Emergency&Accidents 6-7 ave Sports in general 5-6 40 
12 Thematic projects 7 ave Health&Wellness 6-7 ave Interviews 7 ave Interviews 5-6 38 
13 Education 7-8 ave Crime&Corruption 6-7 ave Regional news 7 ave Analysis&Issues 5-6 ave 
14 Health&Wellness 7-8 ave World news 7 ave Sports in general 7-8 39 Regional news 5-6 ave 
15 Industries & Local production  7-8 ave Video content 7-8 ave Cars  7-8 ave Crime&Corruption 6-7 33 
16 Law, Order, Persecution 8 ave Cars 8 ave Photo content 7-8 ave World news 6-7 ave 
17 Sports in general 8-9 33 Photo content 8 ave Health&Wellness 8 ave Health treatment 7 26 
18 Emergency&Accidents 9 ave Technology 8 ave Opinion 8 ave Reportage&Stories 7 ave 
19 Photo content 9 ave People 8 ave Analysis&Issues 9 ave Blog content 7-8 31 
20 Analysis&Issues 9 ave Reportage&Stories 8-9 ave Entertainment 9 ave People 8 ave 
21 People 10 ave Opinion 10-11 ave History & Local Studies 11 33 Video content 8-9 ave 
22 Local news 10 ave - - - People 11-12 ave Technology 9 ave 
23 Official news 11 ave - - - - - - Photo content 9 ave 
24 - - - - - - - - - Opinion 12 ave 
(3) 
 All alternative-agenda news portals, 2008-2012 Metropolitan alternative-agenda news portals Regional and local alternative-agenda news portals Pro-government ‘alternative’ portals, mid2000s – 2012  
Most ‘weighty’ menu entries
1 Society Arts Society Politics 
2 Economics Society Economics Economics 
3 City&Community Economics Latest news Society 
4 Arts City&Community City&Community Emergency&Accidents 
5 Education Opinion Culture Opinion 
6 Entertainment Kids&Youth News to use Various kinds of sports Sports in general 
7 Analysis&Issues News to use Entertainment Kids&Youth Politics Culture 
8 World news Analysis&Issues Health treatment Entertainment Technology Photo content 
9 Kids&Youth World news Education Health treatment Regional news Analysis&Issues 
10 Health treatment Kids&Youth World news Education People Blogs&Multimedia 
11 Latest news Health treatment Analysis&Issues World news Sports in general Show business 
12 Culture Latest news National news Analysis&Issues Emergency&Accidents Cars 
13 National news Culture Forecasts&Reviews National news Education Video content 
14 Cinema&TV National news Science Photo content Transport&Infrastructure - 
15 Media Cinema&TV Cinema&TV Forecasts&Reviews Reportage&Stories - 
16 Politics Blogs&Multimedia Media Science Cinema&TV - 
17 Forecasts&Reviews Photo content Rights&Freedoms Cinema&TV Opinion - 




18 Science Thematic projects Culture Blogs&Multimedia Analysis&Issues Blogs&Multimedia - 
19 Regional news Media Books&Literature Media Entertainment Analysis&Issues - 
20 Various kinds of sports Politics Power&State Thematic projects Social security Entertainment - 
Probable menu structures 
 Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % Entry name # % 
1 Latest news 1 50 National news 1 67 Latest news 1 42 Analysis&Issues 1 100 
2 National news 1 50 CinemaTV 1-2 100 Society 1 33 Economics 2 100 
3 World news 2 33 World news 2 40 Education 3 40 Politics 2 ave 
4 Education 3 40 Entertainment 4 100 Technology 3 ave Society 3-4 ave 
5 Science 4 67 Science 4 67 Transport&Infrastructure 4 100 Emergency&Accidents 5 100 
6 Arts 4 ave Arts 4 ave Economics 4 43 Sports in general 6 100 
7 Kids&Youth 4 ave Kids&Youth 4 ave Cinema&TV 4-5 67 Culture 7 100 
8 Cinema&TV 4 ave Opinion 4-5 ave Politics 4-5 ave Opinion 7 ave 
9 Culture 5 33 Health treatment 5 100 Social security 5 100 Cars 8 100 
10 Society 5 ave Culture 5 67 Reportage&Stories 5-6 ave Show business 9 100 
11 Politics 5 ave News to use 5 ave Culture 6 ave Photo content 10 100 
12 Forecasts&Reviews 5 ave Forecasts&Reviews 5 ave Regional news 6 ave Blog content 11 100 
13 Opinion 6 ave Blog content 5 ave People 7 50 Video content 12 100 
14 Health treatment 6 ave Education 6 ave Sports in general 7 50    
15 Photo content 7 33 Media 6 ave Emergency&Accidents 7 50    
16 Economics 7 ave Photo content 7 50 Analysis&Issues 9 ave    
17 Media 7 ave Power&State 7 ave Blog content 9-10 ave    
18 Analysis&Issues 8 ave Society 8 67 City&Community 10 ave    
19 Thematic projects 8 ave Analysis&Issues 8 ave Opinion 11 ave    
20 Blog content 9-10 ave Thematic projects 8-9 ave Various kinds of sports 12 100    
21 Entertainment 10-11 ave Economics 9-10 ave Entertainment 13-14 ave    
22 City&Community 11 ave Books&Literature 9-10 ave - - -    
23 Various kinds of sports 12 100 City&Community 12 ave - - -    
24 News to use 15-16 ave Rights&Freedoms 19 ave - - -    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
